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1 Unchaining the Token Economy Through CrossLedger Interoperability
Ali Sunyaev, Niclas Kannengießer
Transfers of ownership of assets (e.g., fiat money,
company shares, or usage rights) between agents (here,
individuals or organizations) is often mediated by trusted
third parties (TTPs) such as banks or notaries to increase
reliability of the transfer process. The involvement of TTPs
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often introduces drawbacks, like increased costs, longer
processing time, and the presence of a single point of
failures. These drawbacks motivate the automation and
decentralization of several services offered by TTPs.
Technological advances have enabled the digital representation and management of asset ownerships using
tokens on decentralized digital platforms without the need
for TTPs. A token is a sequence of characters that serves as
an identifier for a specific asset (e.g., a personalized usage
rights) or asset type (e.g., a cryptocurrency). The abilities
to represent assets in form of digital tokens on a decentralized digital platform and to assign ownership of these
assets to agents in a fraud-resistant way can help to reduce
drawbacks related to TTPs (e.g., the presence of single
points of failures) and enable a new type of economy: the
token economy. In tackling drawbacks related to TTPs, the
token economy holds a large transformative value (Benlian
et al. 2018) that can strongly affect businesses (e.g., by
enabling novel business models and increasing transparency of business processes) and our daily life (e.g., by
being able to monetize our own personal data instead of
just giving it away).
This chapter discusses the key concept of decentralization, which the token economy is built on, from two fundamental perspectives (i.e., technical and political
decentralization) and provides propositions to discuss
decentralization. Moreover, this chapter explicates the need
for interdisciplinary research (e.g., information systems
research, computer science, management science, and
social science) to embrace both perspectives.
In the token economy, technical protocols take over
several tasks that traditional TTPs previously handled. For
example, technical protocols running decentralized digital
platforms can check individual agents’ legitimate ownership of assets and create a tamper-resistant record of the
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transfer of their ownership. Moreover, the use of decentralized digital platforms can increase flexibility in using
tokens because agents can implement and use tokens as
identifiers for various types of assets (e.g., usage rights,
land ownership, or money). By reducing the need for traditional TTPs and increasing flexibility, the token economy
holds the potential to support collaborations and cooperation between agents (e.g., in terms of trust; Conway and
Garimella 2020; Tian 2017). Moreover, the token economy
ultimately allows for novel business models (e.g., decentralized crowdsourcing) and improved business relations
(e.g., through increased transparency of business processes) by being able to transfer ownership of physical or
digital assets using tokens.
Like traditional asset transfers, token transfers require
strong security guarantees that decentralized digital platforms must reliably provide. In the token economy, for
example, a decentralized digital platform must guarantee
that users cannot simultaneously use the same tokens
multiple times (i.e., double-spending), while being highly
available and tamper-resistant. Many of the required
security guarantees for business ecosystems are addressed
by the security characteristics of distributed ledger technology (DLT), including fraud-resistance, high availability,
and tamper-resistance. DLT enables the operation of a
highly available, append-only distributed database (i.e., a
distributed ledger) with distributed storage and computing
devices (i.e., nodes) in an untrustworthy environment
(Kannengießer et al. 2020a; Sunyaev 2019) – an environment with arbitrary occurrences of (temporarily) unreachable nodes or fraudulent actions (e.g., double-spending).
From the microeconomic perspective, there can be
multiple instances of the token economy. To create an
instance of the token economy based on DLT, there are two
principal creational options: first, to use custom tokens of a
distributed ledger; second, to create tokens on an existing
distributed ledger (Tönnissen et al. 2020). The first option
is typically pursued by consortia of agents that operate a
private distributed ledger (e.g., using a private Ethereum
blockchain), where only authorized agents can join, read
transactions from, and append new transactions to the
distributed ledger (see Table 1; Kannengießer et al.,

2020a). The second option requires an agent to decide for
an existing distributed ledger for the token economy
instantiation, where they create custom tokens using a
smart contract.
Each creational option has benefits and drawbacks. For
example, private distributed ledgers are often more flexible
in terms of establishing own rules among agents in the
consortium, whereas public ones are more complex to
regulate (e.g., because of their openness for arbitrary
nodes). Nonetheless, using private distributed ledgers
limits the transparency benefits for external agents that are
provided by public ones and can hinder the use of tokens
across token economy instances. Thus, network effects are
reduced, which narrows the reach of the individual token
economy instances.
Besides creational options, agents must gauge operational options. Operational options comprise the assignment of responsibilities to agents in the token economy
instance (e.g., the operation of a node) and the selection
among different distributed ledgers, considering their
technical capabilities (e.g., transaction throughput). For
example, private distributed ledgers often offer a shorter
transaction confirmation latency compared to public-permissionless distributed ledgers, but have a smaller degree
of decentralization and, thus, are less fraud-resistant compared to public ones (Kannengießer et al., 2020a).
DeKannengießer et al., 2020aspite a vast variety of possibilities related to operational options, trade-offs between
DLT characteristics (e.g., availability vs. consistency)
hinder distributed ledgers from being capable of simultaneously fulfilling the requirements of all token economy
instances (Kannengießer et al., 2020a; O’Donoghue et al.
2019). This incapability fuels the development of new and
specialized distributed ledgers designed for similar or different purposes (e.g., Ethereum and Tezos have a strong
focus on decentralized computations, while IOTA focuses
on supporting the Internet of Things with a lightweight
protocol).
The increasing diversity of offered distributed ledgers
that can be used to instantiate a token economy accompanied by the consideration of creational and operational
options pertaining to the creation of token economy

Table 1 Overview of types of distributed ledgers according to their permission models, with private/public referring to read permissions and
permissioned/permissionless referring to write permissions

Private
Public
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Permissioned

Permissionless

Only authorized nodes can join the network

Only authorized nodes can join the network

Only authorized nodes can participate in consensus finding

All connected nodes can participate in consensus finding

Any node can join the network

Any node can join the network

Only defined nodes can participate in consensus finding

All connected nodes can participate in consensus finding
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consortium member may set up an own connector to enable
interoperability and avoid dependencies on other consortium members’ (potentially fraudulent) connectors. Then,
each consortium member is in charge of maintaining an
own connector which increases the overall maintainability
efforts for the distributed ledger compared to the use of
only one connector for the entire distributed ledger (no
decentralization). Because of the individual benefits and
drawbacks of the different degrees of decentralization,
agents must individually decide which degree of decentralization suits their purpose(s) when connecting a distributed ledger to another.
CLI can be achieved in a direct or indirect manner
(see Fig. 1). In direct CLI, neither a traditional TTP nor a
decentralized digital platform is required to enable interoperability between separated distributed ledgers. Nodes of
one distributed ledger can directly communicate with those
of the target distributed ledger. In contrast, indirect CLI
requires a (centralized or decentralized) TTP that mediates
the communication between distributed ledgers. Although
direct CLI is desirable (e.g., less single points of failure),
indirect CLI facilitates interoperability between multiple
distributed ledgers because individual distributed ledgers
must only comply with the specifications of the CLI artifact
instead of the specifications of all target distributed ledgers.
The limited interoperability between distributed ledgers
(e.g., caused by their large heterogeneity) resembles the
incompatibility of (early) electronic data processing
approaches before international standards were introduced
(e.g., SWIFT for financial transactions). To facilitate the
communication between heterogenous distributed ledgers,
interfaces and procedures are required (e.g., like in electronic data interchange during supplier onboarding or in
open banking). For example, standardized interfaces
broaden the compatibility of CLI artifacts with more distributed ledgers and ease the development of flexible
wallets supporting decentralized cross-ledger transactions.

decentralized

direct

centralized

indirect

instances causes heterogeneity within the token economy.
This heterogeneity can cause an isolation of token economy instances because distributed ledgers are still hardly
capable of decentralized interoperability (e.g., for the
interaction between agents and the dynamic emergence of
relations between agents; Moore 2006; Peltoniemi 2005).
Cross-ledger interoperability (CLI) is needed to solve
the challenges related to heterogeneity and to realize the
full potential of the token economy (e.g., regarding business process innovations; Weking et al. 2020). CLI refers
to the communication between distributed ledgers, for
example, to carry out cross-ledger asset transfers or to
execute smart contracts across distributed ledgers (Kannengießer et al. 2020b). So far, progress on CLI has been
largely theoretical (e.g., Back et al. 2014; Herlihy 2018;
Zamyatin et al. 2019). Based on these theoretical contributions, researchers and practitioners have developed various CLI artifacts (e.g., Cosmos and Polkadot) from which
first architectural patterns for the design of CLI artifacts
have emerged, including notary schemes and sidechains
(e.g., Deng et al. 2018; Kannengießer et al. 2020b; Koens
and Poll 2018). These research contributions and practical
implementations represent major advances in CLI, but also
highlight new challenges, such as the atomicity of crossledger transactions and understanding of creational and
operational options beyond the boundaries of individual
distributed ledgers. We categorize these challenges into
two groups: technical decentralization and political
decentralization of CLI.
Technical Decentralization of CLI. Technical decentralization of CLI is the degree that increases (and
decreases) with the number of distributed, interconnected
nodes that operate independently without a central
authority (e.g., a static leader node in consensus finding).
Determining the appropriate degree of technical decentralization currently represents a core challenge within CLI
because it strongly affects the design of CLI artifacts
(e.g., regarding the information flow between distributed
ledgers) and its security characteristics (e.g., atomicity and
availability). One can understand the degree of technical
decentralization as a continuum that ranges from no to full
decentralization. No decentralization of CLI implies that a
single node (i.e., a connector) manages all communication
between distributed ledgers. This single connector represents a single point of failure, which makes no decentralization most comparable to asset transfers using traditional
TTPs (e.g., notaries). In contrast, full decentralization of
CLI requires all nodes of a distributed ledger to have the
capabilities to connect to any other node of any other
distributed ledger, which eliminates that single point of
failure, but can cause large communication overhead. For
example, when a consortium operates a private distributed
ledger and decides to interoperate with another one, each
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Fig. 1 Simplified patterns for centralized/decentralized and direct/
indirect cross-ledger interoperability illustrating a single asset transfer
from the source distributed ledger a to the target distributed ledger b
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Proposition 1: The design and productive operation of
token economy instances require agents to balance centralization and decentralization for distributed ledgers and
CLI.
Political Decentralization of CLI. Political decentralization of CLI refers to the degree of equal distribution of
permissions and responsibilities across all agents that
independently act according to their individual incentives
and work jointly on a common goal. Current studies point
out the complexity of political decentralization, for example, regarding decentralized governance and related political challenges (e.g., organization of decision rights; Beck
et al. 2018; Reijers et al. 2016). To date, agents usually
take part in the governance of the distributed ledger(s) to
which they contribute (e.g., by providing a node). With
CLI, agents can create cross-ledger business relations,
which will affect the creational options (e.g., because of
potentially larger network effects) and the governance of
the involved distributed ledgers. For example, tokens
stored on the target distributed ledger will become usable
for agents of other token economy instances. Technical
advancements can become more difficult because of more
dependencies between distributed ledgers. These exemplary challenges point out the need for decentralized crossledger governance aside from the highly discussed decentralized governance, which mostly focuses on individual
distributed ledgers.
Depending on the degree of technical decentralization
and the choice for direct or indirect asset transfers,
decentralized cross-ledger governance may introduce
political centralization through a hierarchical organization
of nodes. For example, when a consortium uses a single
connector maintained by a single agent (low degree of
technical and political decentralization) to achieve indirect
interoperability, a two-level hierarchical structure emerges
from the roles of the different nodes: regular nodes in the
distributed ledger and the connector. The emergence of this
hierarchy indicates a low technical and political degree of
decentralization because permissions and responsibilities
are not equal among nodes. In the previous example, the
single agent controlling the connector represents a kind of
TTP, introduces a single point of failure, and can impede
CLI and the token economy instances on separate distributed ledgers, for example, by delaying or blocking
agents’ asset transfers or becoming a performance bottleneck. Agents of the separate distributed ledgers depend on
few agents controlling the respective connectors (e.g., regarding the implementation of technical updates for CLI),
potentially giving rise to hierarchy in the governance of
CLI and, eventually, of the individual distributed ledgers.
In full technical decentralization with direct interoperability, all nodes (and consequently all agents that control
nodes) reside on the same hierarchical level. This favors
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democratic decisions of nodes across distributed ledgers,
the integration of CLI artifacts, and the interoperability
with token economy instances across distributed ledgers.
Proposition 2: The degree of decentralization of the
token economy depends on the degree of decentralization
of individual token economy instances and their interoperability considering multiple perspectives (e.g., political
and technical).
Drawing from the introduced limitations of separated
token economy instances and our propositions, we conclude that there is a pressing need for CLI resulting from
the inherent characteristics of the token economy that
reflect those attributed to business ecosystems (e.g., competition and cooperation between organizations). A single
(kind of) CLI artifact will not interconnect all distributed
ledgers, and we will witness a large heterogeneity of distributed ledgers and CLI artifacts that use the full spectrum
of the degree of decentralization and direct and indirect
CLI. For example, no decentralization of CLI could be
used for confidential data management, while full decentralization of CLI better prevents censorship across distributed ledgers.
The consideration of human actors in the design of
distributed ledgers and CLI artifacts points out the complex
and strong interdependence between technical decentralization and political decentralization to achieve true
decentralization. The complexity of this interdependence
makes it challenging to understand the relationship
between the social and the technical and to explain the
effects of decentralization on the token economy and ISs in
general when only one of the two domains is considered.
To really understand decentralization of ISs, research
should combine the social and the technical and take a
sociotechnical perspective on decentralization (Sarker et al.
2019). Thereby, information systems (IS) research can be
the missing link between the technical and the political
perspective on decentralization.
To discuss emerging areas for interdisciplinary research
related to technical and political decentralization in the
token economy and especially point out the importance of
IS research and innovations in this emerging field, we
invited researchers and practitioners with different foci on
the token economy. The invitees present emerging trends
related to the token economy and draw propositions from
their scientific and practical works.
Roman Beck (European Blockchain Center, IT University of Copenhagen) sheds light on the standardization in
DLT from a macroeconomic perspective and discusses the
token economy as a foundation for network goods represented as tokens.
Horst Treiblmaier (Modul University Vienna) synthesizes the concept of sustainability with the many facets of
the token economy and concludes with an agenda for token
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sustainability. Thereby, he clarifies the role of the token
economy based on decentralized digital platforms to
innovate existing business models and even create new
ones.
Mary Lacity (Blockchain Center of Excellence,
University of Arkansas) introduces existing applications of
the token economy in supply chain management to track
and trace assets and shows novel directions for future
research and practice.
Johann
Kranz
(Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität
Munich) elaborates on DLT systems’ potential for decentralizing the digital economy. He argues that decentralization is a possible remedy to mitigate the excessive
concentration of epistemic and economic power of a few
dominant firms which raises increasing social, political,
and economic concerns.
Gilbert Fridgen (University of Luxembourg) elaborates
on the innovations emerging from the token economy from
the perspectives of the industry and individuals and elaborates on the decentralization of token economies.
Ulli Spankowski (Börse Stuttgart) discusses the innovations through the token economy from the finance perspective and proposes potential transformations of the
financial market through tokenization based on DLT.
André Luckow (BMW Group) presents the potential of
the token economy for the automotive industry by
improving supply chain transparency by means of the
example of the DLT system Partchain.

2 Standardized Tokens as Network Goods and Source
of Value Creation
Roman Beck
The token economy depends on the widespread acceptance and use of interoperable DLT protocols as interaction
standard in order to benefit from positive network effects in
inter-organizational networks and to avoid challenges that
can occur when different DLT protocols compete in the
same industry or market. Competition between DLT protocol standards can jeopardize value creation in inter-organizational networks, as DLT protocols share
characteristics of club, common, and public goods that only
unfold their full potential when assimilated widely. Once a
DLT protocol is instantiated in a specific way, it is called
DLT system.
In other words, standardization of DLT protocols to
harvest their potential benefits is more complicated than
standardization of goods that have predominantly a standalone value, as is typically the case with private goods.
Furthermore, tokens cannot unfold their potential unless a
supporting system is in place, comprising commonly
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accepted norms, agreements off-ledger, and technical
norms and rules enforced on-ledger. Only after commonly
accepted sociotechnical systems have been assimilated,
value creation in inter-organizational networks can take
place.
2.1 Tokens as Public Good
The reason why companies struggle to realize the potential
of the emerging token or DLT economy is that it is not
about innovating a private good, but about innovating a
network good, which shares more similarities with public
goods rather than private goods. Commercial models
generally only address private goods scenarios.
Public goods are also referred to as ‘‘collective consumption goods’’ (Samuelson 1954, p. 387), as they can be
used simultaneously while at the same time nobody can be
excluded from their use. From that, the principles of nonrivalry and non-exclusion in consumption derive to classify
goods (Samuelson 1954).
If a good, such as a token standard, is characterized by
non-rivalry, then the consumption of the standard is not
interfered with by the simultaneous use of the same standard by someone else. Several entities can use the same
good to the same extent under same conditions. If a good
possesses non-exclusion properties, then no one can be
excluded from the consumption of the good. The ability to
exclude someone from consumption is a necessary condition for the supply of private goods. But the ability to
exclude someone is not given per se, but by assignment of
property rights (Musgrave, 1959, p. 9).
Pure public goods are given if a good fulfills both criteria. The opposite of this is the pure private good, characterized by rivalry in consumption and the possibility to
exclude others from consumption: if a unit of the private
good is consumed, then it is no longer available to other
consumers. Table 2 depicts a classification of pure public
and private goods together with possible other combinations. Club goods are characterized by the fact that consumers are excludable and – to a certain degree – that they
are non-rivalry in consumption. Typical examples of this
category are permissioned public DLT systems where
access is only granted if certain conditions are fulfilled.
Common goods possess rivalry in consumption, but
exclusion is not possible.
Table 2 Classification of goods
Excludable

Non-excludable

Rivalry

Private goods

Common goods

Non-rivalry

Club goods

Public goods
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Proposition 3: DLT-based tokens have public goods
characteristics as driver of value creation in inter-organizational use cases.
2.2 Standards and Network Goods
Digital goods constituting network standards, such as the
internet, can be used anywhere in the world (Shapiro et al.
1998) and, thus, are not restricted to a certain geography of
jurisdiction. Hence, the scope and potential application of
digital goods is considerably broader compared to physical
goods (Choi et al. 1997), which is why the standardization
of DLT systems in general and DLT-based tokens specifically is of enormous macroeconomic importance for decades to come.
Digital public goods with strong positive network effect
characteristics are called network goods. Network goods
constitute quasi-standards as they require a critical mass of
significant size which is why one will rarely find them
covering just a small market segment (Economides and
Himmelberg 1995). DLT systems and tokens based upon
them are network goods, which extend the traditional
goods classification as illustrated in Table 2, as will be
explained in the following and is illustrated in Table 3
(adapted from Beck 2007).
Pure private goods are characterized by perfect competition in all product and factor markets, perfect information (complete, accurate, and freely available) on the
relevant prices and characteristics of products and factors,
and perfect mobility of all resources. Furthermore, and in a
direct distinction to public goods, pure private goods must
not have any kind of externalities (positive or negative) in
the production and consumption of goods or any other
interdependence in consumption between consumers. To
guarantee a functioning market, private goods must always
have an excludability property, meaning that everyone but
the buyer of the good is excluded from its benefits. Some
goods have the characteristics partly of private goods (no
effects or spillovers on third parties in the case of a pure
private good) and partly of public goods at the same time.
It is possible for the market to produce such club goods to a
limited extent (Buchanan 1965), but not at an appropriately
satisfying level for all market participants.
DLT systems can be implemented as permissioned
public systems, where access must be granted by a governing body (club network good) or as permissionless
Table 3 Extended classification
of goods
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public system, (pure network good). In both cases, the
collective use is not only possible, but necessary, while the
value of a pure public good is not defined or does increase
with the number of collective users.
Proposition 4: DLT systems and tokens based upon them
are network goods where collective use in not only possible, but necessary to increase value creation in inter-organizational use cases.
2.3 Token Standardization and Network Effects
Network externalities can be considered as effects ‘‘in
which the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from
trade regarding network participants’’ (Liebowitz and
Margolis 1995). Exploitability gains can only be realized if
the same solution is used over the whole network, which is
the reason why standardization is important. Network
effects exist horizontally among users of DLT systems
(direct) and vertically from the availability of supporting
products and services (indirect). In both cases, the individual assimilation decision to use a certain DLT system
and related tokens affects the assimilation behavior of other
market participants. This interdependency is characterized
as bandwagon-, herd-, avalanche-, and Veblen-effects
(Ceci and Kain 1982; Choi 1997; Leibenstein 1950).
Network-effects-generating DLT systems call for a large
number of users in order to generate value in inter-organizational networks. As the assimilation outcome of network goods can lead to multiple market equilibria (Arthur
1983, 1989), a formalized standardization process can
guide the assimilation process toward a collectively preferred and stable outcome. As network goods tend to create
natural monopolies with strong lock-in effects, it is crucial
to define standards for DLT systems that account for economic and societal implications.
Proposition 5: Standardization of DLT systems and
tokens based upon them that are characterized by strong
direct and indirect network effects has strong economic
implications for providing value in inter-organizational use
cases.
2.4 Standards and Value Creation
As any profit-oriented organization, the existing DLTbased commercial models are mainly focused on maximizing revenue, i.e., aiming for an installed base of users,

Excludable

Non-excludable

Collective use impossible (rival)

Private goods

Common goods

Collective use (non-rival) possible

Club goods

Public goods

Collective use (non-rival) necessary

Club network goods

Network goods
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increasing market share, and maintaining a low operation
cost. When an operator of commercial DLT systems considers interoperability with other DLT systems, standards
are needed, but also the integrity of the existing commercial needs to be assured. The commercial value for standards can be to engage with a complementing system (e.g.,
a logistic chain connecting to a finance chain), or a competing solution (i.e., two logistic chains).
In case of cooperation with a complementing system,
the purpose is to make the own DLT-based services more
complete, e.g., through the exchange of tokens, so that
users may find it beneficial to interact and conduct transactions between chains, which in turn increases the number
of users of both systems. In case of cooperating with a
competing system, the commercial situation is more complicated. While the standards-based ability to cooperate
may increase the number of transactions that otherwise
would not be possible to generate, the risk emerges that
users may migrate from one DLT system to another,
thereby abandoning one or the other completely. It will
affect the increase in the number of users or even bring
about a decrease, by users moving to the competitive
solution. A DLT systems standard in this case allows for
competition within the same system, among two or more
competing DLT systems and token providers.
Nevertheless, similar to the complementary cooperation
scenario, it must be avoided that the potential increase of
operating costs exceeds the expected possible positive
network effects. Thus, it requires comprehensive preparation and risk mitigation strategies developed upfront before
one engages in cooperation with a competing system.
Apart from direct commercial models of DLT systems
cooperation, there are also indirect commercial models that
enable standards-based cooperation among DLT systems.
For example, some DLT systems cooperation solutions are
based on an intermediary platform, e.g., as Blockchain-asa-Service (Kernahan et al. 2021) which is a commercial
model that has emerged to meet the need for cooperation.
An overview of standards-based cooperation forms and
related value creation in inter-organizational systems is
illustrated in Table 4. The cost of outsourcing
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interoperability services to a provider should be less than
the cost of self-implementing interoperability to other DLT
systems.
Proposition 6: Standardization of DLT systems and
tokens based upon them enable new forms of cooperation
to generate value directly and indirectly in inter-organizational use cases.
Where DLT systems interact, the management of user
roles, permission rights, and the exchange of tokens indicating ownership becomes more complex. Governance
instruments need to be agreed upon in interoperability
relations that clarify decision rights, distribution of incentives, and accountabilities between two or more involved
DLT and non-DLT systems, enacted on-chain in the
autonomous interplay between chains, or off-chain in a
clearing and settlement that requires organizational
involvement.

3 The Token Economy and Sustainability: Silver Bullet
or Hype?
Horst Treiblmaier
As of 2020, it is hard to ignore the substantial problems
that mankind or, more precisely, the planet earth faces.
Societal and economic injustice result in armed conflicts all
over the world, while rapidly dwindling resources and
increasing environmental pollution are altering the face of
the earth. The environmental forecast is particularly
alarming with extreme weather incidents increasing, species disappearing and substantial damage being done to the
oceans, all of which will dramatically affect societies and
economies (Winston 2018). In view of these threats, it is
not surprising that new technologies are eagerly scrutinized
regarding their ability to contribute to a sustainable environmental, social, and economic development. To shed
light on how tokens and token economies can have a
positive impact on sustainability, we first need to clarify
the underlying terms, namely sustainability and token
economy, the latter of which is based on distributed ledger
technology (DLT).

Table 4 Direct and indirect cooperation models
Complementing cooperation

Competing cooperation

Direct
value

New services and value creation across complementing systems

New fee and service exchange models where cooperation is
unavoidable, or customer bases need to be shared

Indirect
value

New supporting service providers such as Blockchain-as-aService, jointly operated trusted oracles to provide synergy
effects

New support service providers to protect intellectual property,
encrypt data, or provide Chinese walls to protect commercial
claims
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3.1 The Broad Concept of Sustainability
A widely used sustainability definition stems from the
World Commission on Environment and Development
(1987, p. 37): ‘‘Sustainable development is development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’’.
According to Murphy (2012) there are three reasons why
sustainability is a so-called wicked problem for which no
easy solution exists. First, the consequences of unsustainable practices may be distant in both time and space.
Second, successful local micro sustainability initiatives do
not necessarily work on a greater scale. Third, numerous
sustainability threats require instant change, but different
views of sustainability embedded in our society impede
fast solutions.
The huge importance of sustainability was recognized
by the IS community and led to several calls for an
increased contribution (vom Brocke et al. 2013). For
example, more than a decade ago a research agenda was
already proposed to establish the new subfield of energy
informatics, which applies IS thinking and skills to increase
energy efficiency (Watson et al. 2010). Yet, the current
sustainability situation demands increased efforts and
‘‘sustainability should be a core imperative in IS research’’
(Seidel et al. 2017, p. 46).
The so-called weak sustainability perspective, which is
endorsed by many international organizations and nation
states, advocates a substitution of natural capital by manmade capital. In contrast, the strong sustainability perspective, mostly endorsed by ecological economists and
natural and social scientists, rejects this assumption of
substitutability (Daly and Cobb 1989). More specifically, it
considers a healthy environment to be the basis for further
social and economic development. In response to the
manifold environmental, economic and societal problems,
the 193 member countries of the United Nations adopted a
comprehensive set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) in the 2015 United Nations General Assembly.
These SDGs comprise numerous subgoals that include a
wide array of environmental and humanitarian objectives
(United Nations 2018). While undoubtedly all of these
goals are important, the broad coverage of the goals makes
it fairly easy to label a specific project or technology
application as ‘‘sustainable’’ – especially, if the sum of its
impact is not considered and a weak sustainability perspective is taken that allows for the substitution of capital.
3.2 The Many Facets of the Token Economy
Tokens residing on distributed ledgers come in many forms
and shapes and offer a huge number of different use cases
(Tönnissen et al. 2020). They can be generated at the

123

protocol layer inherent to a specific ledger, in which case
they are frequently labeled as ‘coins’, or they can reside on
the application layer and are minted by smart contracts.
Tokens can represent digital or physical assets and enable
alternatives and direct ways of raising capital in the form of
initial coin offerings (ICOs), security token offerings
(STOs), or equity token offerings (ETOs), with the latter
two gaining increasing importance in recent years (Kranz
et al. 2019). Tokens can also cater for payment purposes as
a digital representation of value that is not created by a
central bank and utility tokens grant access rights to
specific services. Core characteristics of tokens are the ease
with which they can be created and distributed. In many
cases, they enable a direct interaction between token users
and token creators, which facilitates complex market
structures by avoiding intermediaries. Considering the
numerous forms that tokens can take, it is not surprising
that many of their (envisioned) use cases can have an
environmental, social, or economic impact.
3.3 Tokens as Enablers and Drivers of Sustainable
Development
The most notorious association between distributed ledgers
and their environmental impact is presumably the huge
energy consumption of Bitcoin, caused by the underlying
consensus mechanism using proof-of-work (PoW) that is
required to secure the public and permissionless distributed
ledger using automated and decentralized governance. An
objective and thorough assessment of the total environmental impact of Bitcoin in light of its (envisaged) societal
benefits goes far beyond the scope of this brief discussion
but is urgently needed for a comprehensive and fair evaluation of its total impact (Sedlmeir et al. 2020). At least,
this example illustrates how the manifold positive effects
of a cryptocurrency do not come without detrimental side
effects, both of which can be easily assessed in terms of
sustainability. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that
alternative consensus mechanisms exist or are currently
under development that might serve as alternatives or
supplements to PoW soon. It is therefore crucial to point
out that DLT, or, more specifically, its mix of fundamental
building blocks, including linked timestamping, digital
cash, proof of work, byzantine fault tolerance, asymmetric
cryptography and smart contracts (Narayanan and Clark
2017), is under constant development, and every use case
needs to be assessed regarding its specific implementation
and outcomes rather than asserting that the whole token
economy will exert a specific impact on sustainability.
Considering the lack of specificity of the fundamental
concepts surrounding distributed ledgers, the question
arises of whether the use of tokens can substantially contribute to a more sustainable development in the first place,
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and, if so, how such an impact can be objectively assessed.
As a gross classification, two types of use cases need to be
differentiated, namely those that provide an improvement
over the current status quo and those that would be
impossible without an underlying token.
In the first group of use cases, tokens act as moderators
that make the current flow of operations smoother and, in
doing so, create a positive effect on sustainability. An
exemplary use case represents the trading of CO2 certificates where carbon credits are converted into tokens that
can easily be traded via a distributed ledger. The facilitation of trading in combination with increased transparency
is supposed to yield several positive outcomes. For example, the efficiency of decentralized trading platforms can
make peer-to-peer trading viable and allow for trading of
energy within urban neighborhoods. Additionally,
enhanced transparency can help to create a system that is
less prone to fraud and is resilient against, for example,
manipulation of measurements, sale of faked carbon credits
or the theft of such credits. The security of distributed
ledger tokens thus prevents many fraudulent activities and
presents a solution that is robust to fraud (Lockley et al.
2019).
Another example is the application of tokens in supply
chains to improve transparency and yield desirable effects
such as improved food safety, reduced food waste, and
provable fair labor conditions. In this context, tokens representing assets constitute an important building block of a
more comprehensive concept that is labeled ‘‘Physical
Internet’’. This concept aims to combine physical, informational and financial flows to create value chains that
operate with highest possible efficiency, flexibility and
productivity. The resulting gains pertain to environmental
(e.g., reduction of emissions), social (e.g., fair working
conditions and wages) and economic (e.g., fair sharing of
revenues) sustainability (Treiblmaier 2019).
Taken together, all these positive effects would be much
harder to achieve without an underlying distributed ledger
and digital tokens that represent specific assets and allow
for an easy tracking and tracing of physical and data flows.
Proposition 7: DLT-based tokens increase the efficiency
of existing sustainability use cases.
In the second group of use cases, tokens provide a
‘conditio sine qua non’. An example is the creation of a
monetary system that prioritizes financial inclusion and the
provision of a stable monetary supply that fosters longterm economic development. History has shown that in the
long run governments and central banks cannot resist the
temptation to increase the monetary supply with the goal to
support the economy in case of a recession, but also to bail
out banks and finance war (Ammous 2018). The consequence of such an increase is usually a fall in interest rates
which should increase economic activity but regularly also
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causes inflation. An economy in which the money supply is
regulated by code rules out all temptations to interfere with
the monetary system, spawning numerous positive and
negative implications. The former help to create sustainable societies from an economic and social perspective.
The potential of DLT does not stop here, as is evidenced
by so-called demurrage currencies in which the value of the
respective token loses value over time. This is intended to
encourage spending rather than hoarding currency in order
to support the economy and human wellbeing (Leonard and
Treiblmaier 2019). On a small scale, experiments with
demurrage currencies have shown positive effects on
communities in Austria and Germany during times of
recession in the 1930s but they were never applied on a
large scale due to lack of scalability and, even more
important, strong resistance from the Austrian central bank.
Of course, this example should not be misunderstood as a
recommendation to try out a rather untested and potentially
risky monetary system but should serve as an example of
how technology might enable visionary ideas whose realizations have so far been impossible from a technical
perspective. Other use cases, which might sound less disruptive, include the transformation of market structures
caused by disintermediation, as is currently happening
through the tokenization of value networks (Lohmer and
Lasch 2020).
Proposition 8: DLT-based tokens enable novel and
innovative sustainability use cases.
3.4 A Token Sustainability Agenda
Given the growing popularity of DLT and token economies, it is foreseeable that a substantial number of
upcoming studies will investigate the application of tokens
to create a more sustainable future. While this development
is laudable, it is also crucial that every study clearly
describes both positive and negative effects which result
from the deployment of tokens.
Rather than simply labeling a specific token project as
sustainable and highlighting one specific sustainability
dimension, the sum of all external effects needs to be
described as thoroughly as possible. For example, tokens
that allow for financial inclusion, but rely on public DLTs
using a PoW-based consensus mechanism might help to
alleviate poverty (SDG1) and reduce inequality (SDG10),
but simultaneously might not be energy efficient (SDG12)
and, thus, have a negative impact on climate change
(SDG13). Chances are that in most cases such trade-offs
cannot be avoided. Obviously, this should not stop the
industry and academia from developing and applying
token-based solutions for pending problems and researchers from investigating how the token economy can help to
improve sustainability. Rather, an open and critical
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discussion is needed which includes the positive and negative effects that a specific (token-based) solution creates.
A comprehensive research agenda for the impact of token
economies on sustainability thus necessitates a common
understanding of the core terms, the development of
measurement tools that allow for the comparability of use
cases, and the creation of agreement on what sustainability
actually means and which of its many dimensions deserve
priority.

4 Tracking Assets in Supply Chains with Distributed
Ledger Technologies
Mary Lacity
For the past three decades, companies have been
improving internal supply chain operations through the
adoption of ERP, sensor devices, Six Sigma quality
improvement programs, and improved inventory management practices. Many supply chain operations are lean, but
only within the boundaries of the firm. Across firm
boundaries, supply chain partners still face significant
challenges trying to synchronize the data about the flow of
physical goods with the actual flow of goods. Because each
partner independently maintains its own systems of record,
the records often do not match across supply chain partners, which results in disputes, delays, lost products, and
expensive reconciliations. For example, 70 percent of
invoices among Walmart Canada’s freight carriers were
disputed due to inconsistent data about the location, status,
and pricing of freight (Wolfson 2020). Distributed ledger
technology (DLT) offers a new approach based on asset
tokenization, smart contracts for processing transactions
pertaining to the asset, and a tamper-proof ledger shared by
all authorized parties (van Hoek et al. 2019; Westerkamp
et al. 2018). When Walmart Canada and its freight operators adopted DLT, invoice disputes fell from 70 percent to
less than two percent (Wolfson 2020).
Several other DLT applications for tracking assets
across supply chain partners are in use today, led by GE
Digital, Golden State Foods, Everledger, the IBM Food
Trust, MediLedger, TradeLens, VeriTX, and EY WineChain. When trading partners agree to the status of an
asset, business value results in terms of lower transaction
costs due to fewer disputes, better authentication of assets,
counterfeit prevention, better product quality and freshness, and less time to process food and drug recalls.
In our research, we explore how assets are tokenized in
DLT applications to automate transactions for supply chain
partners (Lacity 2020). While tokens may represent fungible (non-unique) assets like cryptocurrencies, loyalty
rewards, and airline miles, our interest is in using tokens to
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represent non-fungible assets, a particular asset in the real
world. For example, a token is created by hashing1 a
Unique ID (UID) to represent a particular diamond, shipping container, medical device, plot of land, work of art, or
sellable unit of a pharmaceutical or food product. Smart
contracts are programmed to process sensor readings so
that when events happen to the physical asset, such as a
physical movement, a change of ownership, a change of
status, or a physical transformation – its digital counterpart
is updated on the DLT application. The supply chain
partners, if given permission rights, all store identical
replications of a tamper-resistant record of events.
Studies of DLT applications revealed three ways that
first generation DLTs tokenize UIDs: stickers/stamps,
branding/watermarks, and self-identification (see Table 5).
Each approach has its benefits and limitations.
Stickers/Stamps. The enterprise assigns and adheres a
machine-readable sticker or stamp of a unique identifier
(UID) to the physical product and creates a token of the
UID by hashing the unique ID. Golden State Foods and
EY’s WineChain use this approach.
Golden State Foods (GSF), a $5 billion US-based Foods
Services company, uses RFID, IoT sensors and DLT to
ensure product freshness of its beef patties through the
entire supply chain. At the GSF manufacturing plant in
Alabama, GSF encodes a UID for a sellable unit (a box of
patties) in an RFID tag for the physical asset and records
the hashed value on a permissioned DLT application.
Boxes are loaded and sealed into a pallet which then gets a
unique pallet ID that is also recorded on the distributed
ledger. Pallets also have IoT temperature sensors that
automatically update the DLT application along the supply
chain. The sensor is read as it exits the manufacturing
plant, on all the trucks involved with delivery, at the distribution center, and at the retail stores, which must have
IoT devices within their refrigerators. After final delivery,
GSF continues to assist the retail store owners by notifying
them if a box is about to expire or if their cooler is not
maintaining proper temperatures (such as if an employee
failed to close the cooler door). This way, GSF helps
retailers ensure that their beef patties are always safe and
fresh (Zemsky et al. 2020).
EY developed WineChain to restore trust in the wine
supply chain. Wine fraud is a chronic problem, with over
€2.7 billion counterfeit wines and spirits sold to Europeans
each year (Smith 2017). With WineChain, each wine bottle
gets a unique QR code that is posted to the public Ethereum
1

A hash function is an algorithm that transforms original data into a
unique number (referred to as hash value). A hash function only
works one-way so that the original data will always produce that
unique number. Given the hash value, it is computationally infeasible
to figure out the original data. The procedure of creating a hash value
from data is called hashing.

A. Sunyaev et al.: Token Economy, Bus Inf Syst Eng 63(4):457–478 (2021)

467

Table 5 Three examples of ways to represent assets on DLTS based on Unique IDs
Description

Stickers/stamps

Branding/watermarks

Self-identification

Examples

The digital token represents a has value of a
UID that is adhered to the physical
product’s packaging with a sticker or stamp

The digital token represents a
hash value of a UID embedded
within the physical product

The digital token represents a UID created by
scanning the physical properties of the asset.
Every time the physical asset is scanned, it
generates the same UID

Benefits

Golden State Foods and EY WineChain

VeriTX

Everledger and VeriTX

Limitations

Suitable for food and beverages. Low cost.
Ease of use

Strong coupling of physical
and digital token

Strong coupling of physical and digital token

blockchain. Customers can scan the wine with their
smartphone and get verification if the wine is legitimate.
Wine producers, brokers, importers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers rely on a private Ethereum blockchain to
track the bottle as it moves through the supply chain. As of
April 2020, 15 million bottles had been tokenized and more
than 100 wineries participated (Lacity 2020).
Stickers and stamps are inexpensive and do not require
specialized readers. However, de-coupling of a physical
and digital counterpart may occur on a small scale, for
example, if stickers are damaged or removed. Additionally,
small scale counterfeits might occur, say by consuming a
fine wine, re-using the wine bottle, and re-selling the fake,
but the perpetrator would be caught if they tried to scale the
solution; the winery still has chain of custody visibility and
would be able to pinpoint the common source of repeated
quality complaints, and identify this discrete point of failure in the process.
Branding/Watermarks. A physical product can be
branded similar to a livestock branding or similar to
watermarks embedded in paper money. With this method,
the asset is assigned a UID and a machine-readable version
of the UID is embedded into the physical product. The
branding or watermark ensures the physical product is
always properly identified. For now, this method only
works for durable goods, not for food, beverages, or other
liquids.2 VeriTX uses this approach.
VeriTX is a platform for decentralized manufacturing,
where customers print parts where they need them, when
they need them. Customers can buy tamper-resistant
printing instructions from sellers on the platform. VeriTX
explored a number of approaches to represent assets. One
way was to embed a unique hash value as a ‘‘watermark’’
in the printed part that can be viewed with a camera on a
smartphone. The hash value is permanently stored on the
distributed ledger at the time of origin. Additionally, the
2

There are several innovations under development to embed UIDs
using nanotechnology into food, beverages, and medicines in the
future. IBM calls these ultra-miniaturized cryptographic anchors
(Prisco 2018).

DLT application will also store the part’s every movement
and every transfer of ownership, thus enabling the part to
be tracked through the supply chain (Lacity 2020).
Self-Identification. With self-identification, the physical
asset itself can serve as its own identifier for non-fungible
assets. The physical asset is scanned to extract physical or
chemical fingerprints to create a UID, which is then tokenized on a distributed ledger. Everledger and VeriTX use
this approach.
Everledger tracks diamonds from mines to retail stores.
Founded in 2015, Everledger aims to help stop ‘‘blood
diamonds’’ diamonds mined to finance conflicts in such
places as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and the Ivory
Coast–by better tracking the warranties associated with fair
trade practices established by the United Nations in 2003.
Known as the ‘‘Kimberly Process Certification’’, the process requires sellers of rough and polished diamonds to
insert a warranty declaration on invoices. Everledger creates a unique digital token of the physical diamond by
specifying 40 metadata points using high resolution photographs. Over 1 million diamonds were represented on the
ledger as of March 2017. Everledger has since expanded its
business model to track and trace other valuable assets,
such as gemstones, luxury goods, art, wine, e-recycling and
antiquities (Lacity 2020).
Returning to VeriTX, the company also creates a unique
fingerprint based on 54,000 surface characteristics of the
grain structure of the part. VeriTX tested the sensitivity of
the UID by dropping parts on concrete floors, grinding
them with handheld motors, and grit blasting them. The
fingerprint was still identifiable even when only 3,700
unique surface features remained on the original part. This
fingerprint is used both for identification and counterfeit
mitigation.
The next generation of DTL applications for supply
chains. The first generation of DTL applications presented
here are effective in synchronizing the data about the flow
of physical goods with the actual flow of goods, provided
the sensor data is connected to the DTL application. So far,
the synchronization and trading partner agreement on the
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status of an asset are mostly deterministic systems, i.e.,
relying on if–then-else rules encoded in smart contracts.
Future DLT applications will gain more business value by
including probabilistic data. For example, by estimating the
probability that food is no longer safe to consume based on
the number and duration of temperature excursions traced
by IoT devices. Researchers and enterprises are exploring
the use of machine learning to predict and prevent failures,
schedule maintenance, and model ‘‘what if’’ scenarios for
DLT applications (Bevilacqua et al. 2020). In addition to
more technically focused research, more organizational
research is needed. In our case studies, the selection of
technologies and the coding and testing of application were
between 20 and 30 percent of the effort. Up to 80 percent
of the effort required trading partners to agree on data and
event standards, shared governance models, intellectual
property rights, and compliance assurance. Application
lock-in was also a serious issue, which is why more
research on interoperability is so critical (e.g., Kannengießer et al. 2020b). The overarching research question
is, ‘‘How can we apply these emerging DLTs to deliver
business value?’’.

5 Imagining a Decentralized Digital Economy: Less
Concentration of Epistemic and Economic Power
through DLT systems and Tokens?
Johann Kranz
Data is often regarded as the oil of the digital economy
(e.g., Varian 2018). Although the comparison is not quite
accurate as oil is a private, exclusive good and data can be
used simultaneously and multiple times by many entities
without losing its value (i.e., non-rival use of data), the
availability of both oil and data have brought about
groundbreaking innovation and economic growth. Similar
to oil in the beginning of the twentieth century, today an
oligopoly of dominant firms is controlling access to data –
the most valuable resource of our times. Based on their
dominating positions in essential online service markets
such as search, social networking, commerce, cloud computing, streaming or smart assistants, online service providers (OSPs) like Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, or
Amazon are amassing constantly growing amounts of data
that their users provide wittingly or unwittingly (Easley
et al. 2018; Morey et al. 2015; Spiekermann and Korunovska 2017).
The enormous amounts of proprietary and rich data on
consumer behavior have served as the basis for dominant
OSPs to expand in numerous online and offline markets
(Autor et al. 2020). In recent years, dominant OSPs could
expand their economic and social power at a rapid pace by
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exploiting the competitive edge which their proprietary
data silos give them in data-driven innovation, especially in
artificial intelligence (Berners-Lee 2018). For competitors,
these large, proprietary data silos have created a skewed
level playing field by erecting high barriers for market
entry, competition, and innovation (Haucap 2019).
Concentration of epistemic and economic power. An
increasing number of academics, policymakers, and activists argue that the once free and open internet has been
seized by a few dominant OSPs that cement their position
by taking unfair advantage of their market power (Zuboff
2019). Based on investigations of the functioning of digital
markets (e.g., House Judiciary Committee 2020), EU and
U.S. policymakers accuse dominant OSPs of exploiting
their gatekeeper power by dictating unreasonable terms to
the marketplace, engaging in self-preferencing practices,
using collected data of rivals’ businesses for own commercial activities, and neutralizing emerging competition
by so-called ‘‘killer acquisitions’’. Policymakers in the EU
and the U.S. are expected to introduce new, ex-ante regulatory frameworks to constrain dominant players’ potential
scope for anticompetitive behaviors (e.g., EU’s Digital
Services Act) and have recently filed antitrust lawsuits
against Google, Facebook, and Amazon.
But not only competition in digital markets is undermined by dominant OSPs, also individual privacy, agency,
and eventually democratic principles are endangered by the
economic logic of ‘‘surveillance capitalism’’ (Zuboff
2015). Dominant OSPs have created expansive digital
ecosystems that consider user data as a free commodity
based on which they sell in-depth psychological user profiles and are able to manipulate human behavior (Lanier
2013; Zuboff 2019). The proprietary data silos give OSPs a
tremendous epistemic and economic power (Jones and
Tonetti 2020; Mager and Kranz 2020; Zuboff 2019).
Epistemic power is based on the extreme knowledge
asymmetries that occur because of dominant OSPs’
exclusive access to huge amounts of rich behavioral data.
Economic power accrues based on dominant OSPs’ ability
to leverage their epistemic advantage for improved and
faster decision-making, data-driven innovation, and learning cycles.
Therefore, time is ripe to think about effective strategies
which can mitigate epistemic and economic power of
dominant OSPs beyond privacy and antitrust laws, but by
design. An important part of the conversation on effective
strategies focuses on shifting towards a more decentralized
architecture of the digital economy (see Fig. 2). DLT
systems can enable this shift in two major ways.
Decentralized data storage systems. First, DLT can be
an integral part of decentralized data storage solutions that
allow for individual data controllership and the separation
of data and service layers. Individual data controllership
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Fig. 2 Centralized vs.
decentralized architecture of
digital economies using browser
applications
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enables users to manage, control, and track data access and
usage of online services in a data repository controlled by
users. Technically this can be done by using DLT systems
for controlling data access and retrieving data stored
decentrally on peer-to-peer, off-ledger storage systems
such as the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), Swarm, or
Kademlia (Truong et al. 2019). These decentralized storage
solutions use distributed hash tables to store and retrieve
data in a peer-to-peer network. User-controlled decentralized data storage enhances privacy by design as the hash
codes needed to retrieve data is only known to users and
thus can only be accessed or made accessible for other
actors by individual users. Applying asymmetric encryption ensures that only intended actors can decrypt data.
Furthermore, transparency increases for users because
every time their data is accessed, this can be immutably
recorded on underlying DLT systems.
In this technological setup, data management and controllership are uncoupled from service provision by design
which could lead to more levelled playing fields in online
service markets as users could more easily switch between
services and ‘‘multihome’’. Thus, the power of network
effects that frequently leads to ‘‘winner-takes-it-all’’ situations in the digital economy would be mitigated. Also,

data would be more portable across services allowing
competition to take place on the service level. Hence, the
competitiveness of dominant market players’ rivals would
increase since competitive advantage gained by proprietary
data silos would be rendered less important.
As the use of data is non-rival, the same data could be
shared with or sold by users to multiple entities. This would
create new opportunities for economic participation of
users and unlock data for innovation. Individual data
controllership promises social and economic gains as users
can generate a better allocation of data property rights than
data ownership by firms (Jones and Tonetti 2020). Thus,
more control of data property rights in the hands of users
would lead to the unlocking of proprietary data silos, which
facilitates a provision of data that is close to the social
optimum (Jones and Tonetti 2020).
Proposition 9 a, b: The uncoupling of data management
and controllership from service provision will (a) decrease
customer lock-in such that market concentration in online
service markets will decrease and (b) lead to social and
economic gains through an improved usage of data
resources.
Decentralized applications. Second, DLT systems can
serve as the backbone of decentralized applications
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(DApps) such as the social network Steemit or the rating
service Yup. In contrast to the conventional backend of
web applications, the backends of DApps build upon
decentralized peer-to-peer networks such as Ethereum,
TRON or EOS. These DLT systems are used to manage the
applications’ business logic via a nexus of modular services represented by smart contracts which are autonomously executed (Glaser 2017). The source code of smart
contracts is stored in a subdirectory of a DLT system. If
predefined conditions are met, the contract is automatically
executed without human interference. Thus, instead of the
dominant design of current centralized digital platforms in
which a single entity controls data and information flows
between all stakeholders, DApps reduce power and economic imbalances by design.
DApp providers often issue cryptographic tokens on
their own or existing DLT systems – representations of
assets or rights residing on a DLT system – with limited
supply which users need to use the DApp (Kranz et al.
2019). These tokens are used to build viable business
models around DApps and to incentivize producers of
complementary products and services, as well as users to
buy and use the token. While different economic models of
tokens exist, mostly these models are designed in such a
way that token supply is restricted or dynamically adapted
by DApp providers to ensure that the value of tokens rise
with increasing demand for the DApp. Thus, the economic
model of a DApp token is a key instrument to align all
stakeholders’ interests to focus on the shared goals of
creating and maintaining a thriving and robust DApp
ecosystem. Additional instruments to achieve the long-term
sustainability of a DApp ecosystem and to incentivize
stakeholders’ contributions to the ecosystem are revenue
sharing and participative governance mechanisms. These
mechanisms allow to democratize the created value and
decision rights, which enable new ways of organizing in
the digital space such as cooperatives or decentralized
autonomous organizations (DAOs; Beck et al. 2018; Hsieh
et al. 2018; Kollmann et al. 2020).
Proposition 10 a, b: Increasing diffusion of DApps will
lead to (a) enhanced economic and governance participation of stakeholders in the digital economy and (b) more
decentralized, IS-enabled economic organizing.
As the token economy builds upon decentralized business logic and data layers, it may prove to be a promising
alternative to the current centralized design of the digital
economy which has created powerful oligopolies in
essential online service markets. However, many challenges and open questions remain. First and foremost, we
have not yet seen widespread adoption of DLT systems and
DApps although its unique benefits and potential to transform markets are largely undisputed. But so are DLT
systems’ current weaknesses, such as a lack of
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interoperability, scalability, ease of use, and the energy
thirst of proof-of-work consensus mechanisms which have
to be addressed to overcome adoption barriers and make
sensible use of DLT in the digital economy (Pedersen et al.
2019).
Proposition 11: Joint and balanced increases of DLT
systems’ interoperability, scalability, and ease of use, will
spur adoption of DLT systems in the digital economy.
As the BISE/IS field has expertise in investigating and
designing complex technological, economic, and social
systems, I believe that we are in an excellent position and
may even be obligated to shape a more competitive,
innovative, and nondiscriminatory future digital economy.
Thus, our community should become more involved in the
increasing transdisciplinary academic efforts to develop
solutions on how the concentration of epistemic and economic power in the digital economy can be attenuated.
Also, our research needs to take a closer look at the
unintended consequences and negative externalities of
powerful gatekeepers’ control of essential online services
on competition, innovation, people, and societies (Constantinides et al. 2018; Easley et al. 2018).
However, a decentralized digital economy enabled by
DLT systems as delineated above is no panacea and only a
possible design option towards a future digital economy
that promotes innovation, respects privacy, and operates on
a level playing field. Other market and technology designs
or regulatory frameworks may emerge that prove more
effective in correcting current market failures in the digital
economy. Notwithstanding, our community is called upon
to address the increasing social, political, and economic
concerns of high economic and epistemic power in the
hand of a couple of private, largely unregulated companies.

6 On Tokenization, Transaction Costs, Intermediaries,
and Participation
Gilbert Fridgen
Let us assume that tokenization is nothing more than
some cryptographic solution, replacing anything that
would, in the past, have been certified on a more or less
tamper-proof and unique piece of paper. This is a very
technical definition that focuses only on the medium of
storage: paper vs. a cryptographically secured, digital
medium. This is also a definition that covers most–if not
all–use cases of tokenization to date: cryptocurrencies that
replace cash money, security tokens that replace paperbased securities, tokens that replace signed documents in
business processes, tokens that replace paper tickets, and
even verifiable credentials that can, e.g., replace paperbased passports, drivers’ licenses, or university diplomas.
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Finally, this definition leaves it open, if tokens can or
cannot feature scarcity, i.e., they can or cannot be duplicated. For example, uniqueness is an essential requirement
for cryptocurrencies or security tokens but might be irrelevant to counterproductive for tokens used in business
processes.
6.1 Tokenization and Transaction Costs
A major driver of tokenization represents the prospect of
lowering transaction costs, which is similar to historic
expectations for most digital technologies (Ciborra 1983;
Cordelia 2006): The handling of a digital medium in general causes lower cost than the handling of paper during a
transaction. It is worth noting that this also holds true for
distributed ledgers: Presumed problems regarding their
energy usage and thus cost are questionable (Sedlmeir et al.
2020), especially as reduced paper handling might even
lower resource usage in several use cases (e.g., Jensen et al.
2019). However, according to public discussion, most
hopes are especially set on the potential to avoid the
transaction costs caused not by paper handling but by
intermediaries.
Digital currencies, security tokens, digitally signed
documents, digital tickets, and even verifiable credentials
can, in principle, all be implemented without advanced
cryptography but with the help of intermediaries. The
banking system already provides for digital money transfers or custody without any tokenization. ‘‘Login with’’offers by companies like Apple, Google, or Facebook
already provide verifiable credentials.
However, all of these solutions rely on some degree of
trust in intermediaries that take on the role of a TTP.
Besides their operating cost, their proprietary solutions
often lack interoperability from a technical or regulatory
perspective. Competing intermediaries moreover will avoid
integrating their respective solutions, which would lead to
different incompatible standards. Finally, intermediaries
build a business model that either directly or indirectly
monetizes their role as a TTP (e.g., through fees or monetization of collected data). With the hope to replace TTPs
by tokenization comes the hope to remove the costs of
intermediaries.
Proposition 12: Market participants expect lower
transaction costs in tokenized markets as tokenization
replaces the role of trusted third parties and thus avoids
the cost of intermediaries.
6.2 What Will Tokenization Mean for Intermediaries?
For the traditional financial sector, already Allen and
Santomero (1997, p. 1462) suggest that the ‘‘emphasis on
the role of intermediaries as reducing the frictions of
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transaction costs […] is too strong.’’ They further outline
that ‘‘reducing participation costs, which are the costs of
learning about effectively using markets as well as participating in them on a day-to-day basis’’ is ‘‘an important
service provided by these firms’’. As they see it, a major
role of financial intermediaries is to help customers to
‘‘deal with the increasingly complex maze of financial
instruments and markets’’. Coming from the finance discipline, they especially point to mutual funds as one means
to reach this goal. As of today, financial service providers
could, however, also reach this goal by offering services to
their customers that use modern IT, for example, data
analytics to identify investment opportunities that match
consumers’ needs. Intermediaries’ role of enabling consumers to participate thus does not depend on the role of
being a TTP. Intermediaries’ role of enabling consumers to
participate is moreover unlikely to vanish with
tokenization.
Proposition 13: Despite the vanishing need for a trusted
third party, intermediaries will retain an important market
role.
Lowered transaction costs might even enable use cases
that were costly and cumbersome to implement using traditional means. In the financial sector, tokenization could
increase the granularity of tradeable investment products.
With tokenization, financial markets could evolve from
trading stocks of a whole company (e.g., car manufacturer)
to investing into individual projects (e.g., electric vehicle
division) or even individual production machines
(e.g., battery assembly). New market segments of investors
could become interested in participating in financial markets, for example, when fans cannot only buy the stock of a
publicly listed football club but can even directly co-fund
the contracts of single players. In all these scenarios, we
will need intermediaries that enable investors to participate, not only in terms of regulatory compliant market
access but also to deal with the increasingly complex maze
of tokenized financial instruments and markets.
6.3 From Managing Transactions to Enabling
Participation
Future intermediaries need to determine, for example,
adequate market prices through (sensor) data analytics
around production machinery or football players. They will
furthermore need to understand new market dynamics that
come with utility tokens that are not only an object of
investment but also a consumable means to run a service
(Drasch et al. 2020). Finally, it is possible to store valuables like gold or security papers in your own safe. However, many people will value the professional custody
services of a specialized company—for digital and nondigital assets. Dan Schulman, president and CEO of
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PayPal, described their motivation to offer services around
cryptocurrencies as ‘‘the opportunity, and the responsibility, to help facilitate the understanding, redemption, and
interoperability of these new instruments of exchange’’
(PayPal 2020). Hereby, Schulman basically restates Allen’s
and Santomero’s argument around intermediaries and
participation (1997, p. 1462).
This look into the financial sector is, however, without
loss of generality: Consumers will also need to store other
kinds of tokens, for example, verifiable credentials for their
passports, drivers’ licenses, or university diplomas. Again,
it would be technically possible for the users to store these
on their personal devices. Still, functionalities like providing secure and easy-to-use backups or multi-device
access could be business opportunities and, thus, new roles
for intermediaries.
Proposition 14: Tokenization removes old but also creates new business opportunities for intermediaries, especially in enabling consumers to participate in the token
economy.
Both the internet and the world-wide web were initially
perceived to aim at decentralization (Mathew 2016). The
Mozilla Foundation’s Internet Health Report (Mozilla
Foundation 2019, p. 98) criticizes, however, that ‘‘the
digital world is dominated by eight American and Chinese
companies: Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Alibaba,
Amazon, Apple, Baidu, Facebook, Microsoft, and Tencent.
These companies and their subsidiaries have outsized
control over the internet.’’
On the background of an originally decentralized character of the internet and its later centralization, we cannot
be sure about the effects of tokenization. Reasons for the
internet’s centralization are presumably economies of scale
(De Filippi and McCarthy 2012) and platform ecosystems
(Tiwana 2014). While tokenization promotes decentralization at first sight, it might as well lay the ground for new
centralized business models. Are we sure that a token
economy is not prone to economies of scale and the
mechanisms of platform ecosystems? Tokenization will
create another economic playing field for both, established
players and newcomers in the online world – possibly
leading to centralized market structures again.
Proposition 15: Tokenization will not create a decentralized internet economy.
To sum up, tokenization will further lower transaction
costs. As intermediaries lose their role as trusted third
parties, they need to refocus on market roles that benefit
from the lower transaction costs. Facilitating market participation will be a promising role for intermediaries. This
might again lead to centralized market structures.
Being successful in this environment and in the long run
will require openness towards technical innovation and
strategic foresight. Research in the BISE/IS field is in an
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ideal position to analyze in detail the market dynamics in
various industries that face the effects of tokenization. The
BISE/IS community can thus strongly support businesses
in strategically positioning themselves in a token economy.

7 Tokenization in Financial Markets: Efficiency Gains
and New Investment Opportunities
Ulli Spankowski
Tokenization, from our point of view, describes the
digital securitization of rights and goods via a distributed
ledger. This allows for the transfer of existing financial
products and the creation of new digital assets. In consequence, it enables a transformation process along all stages
of the financial market value chain. A wide variety of rights
and goods can be digitally securitized in tokens. Thereby,
we at Börse Stuttgart distinguish three types of tokens:
Payment tokens are digital means of payment that do not
require a central entity and that have little or no additional
functionality. Payment tokens include cryptocurrencies,
such as Bitcoin or Ripple (XRP). Security tokens correspond to classic securities in their design in that they
resemble stocks (Lambert et al. 2020). Finally, utility
tokens, like vouchers, grant access to services or goods of
the respective issuer. The following sections describe three
major opportunities regarding tokenization: direct investor
access to exchanges, leaner clearing and settlement processes, and increase in investment opportunities.
7.1 Direct Investor Access to Exchanges Without
Intermediaries
New globally and directly accessible marketplaces for
tokens are emerging (e.g., tZERO, OpenFinance Network,
Börse Stuttgart Digital Exchange). These marketplaces can
serve as a secondary market for previously issued tokens.
DLT takes over the tasks of brokers and guarantees the
security and transparency of transactions. Institutional and
private investors worldwide can connect directly to token
marketplaces via customer-specific interfaces without
brokers as TTPs and the associated costs. Depending on the
legal framework, a marketplace can also provide processes
for proving the identity of customers and measures to
combat money laundering. Preliminary verification of
available financial resources is unnecessary, as the
exchange of money for tokens between buyer and seller
can take place in near real-time. These aspects could make
brokers as we know them today obsolete in the process
chain.
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7.2 Leaner Clearing and Settlement Processes
Tokenization might help to break up established monopolies regarding settlement and custody of traditional securities trading and enable leaner processes. If the
receivables, liabilities, and delivery obligations of market
participants can be displayed and viewed at any time on the
ledger, DLT could replace the clearing house and reduce
settlement and counterparty risks. Clearing and transfer of
tokens could be done almost in real time via the distributed
ledger. In that case, a special custody instance would no
longer be necessary for digital assets – everybody can take
care of the custody of their tokens themselves if they wish.
The DLT assuming the tasks of the clearing house and
eliminating the need for a custody instance results in a
leaner overall clearing and settlement process.
7.3 Increase in Investment Opportunities for (Private)
Investors
In the future, the tokenization of assets could open completely new possibilities for (private) investors. For
instance, tokenization might allow investments in fractions
of real estate, in pieces of art, or direct investments in
individual projects of companies. Tokenization may create
liquid markets for previously illiquid assets and could offer
investors secure access to investment opportunities that
were previously not available to them.
Proposition 16 a, b: Tokenization will transform financial markets by (a) giving investors direct access to
exchanges and assets, (b) streamlining the investment
process, and (c) increasing investment opportunities.
However, there remain significant challenges that slow
down the tokenization in financial markets. A major challenge regarding security tokens are regulatory uncertainties. As a digital equivalent of securities, security tokens
are subject to capital market regulation. The various elements of the typical investment value chain, from issuance
over trading to custody, fall under the extensive regulatory
framework for equities, such as the Prospectus Regulation
(PR), Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID
II), Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR),
and Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR).
The classification as regular securities results in trading and
ad-hoc obligations, among other things (Blandin et al.
2019). However, there still is no clear token taxonomy,
especially regarding the regulation of hybrid token forms.
Furthermore, other important regulatory foundations are
missing to enable security tokens to exploit their potential
as efficient, flexible and fungible digital assets (Nägele
2020). While important legal aspects with regards to the
trade and transfer of security tokens are still awaiting
clarification, first issues have already been addressed
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within the European Union. To foster innovation, the
European Commission has proposed the DLT MTF Pilot
Regime. This sandbox enables tokenization without necessarily applying all of the listed capital market frameworks in full. The implications of this sandbox for the final
regulation of security tokens are not clear. On a national
level, the German legislator, for instance, is working on
security token regulation by gradually opening securities
law to digital securities, with the digital global certificate
joining the previously mandatory physical certificate.
However, the so far considered new regulation, which is
mainly applicable for digital bonds, might not be sufficient,
since shares and other securities also would need to be
considered in order for issuers and investors to gain access
to the full range of financing and investment opportunities
in the digital world.
To summarize, tokenization has a huge potential to
transform the financial sector and to improve the investment process by reducing complexity and increasing
investment opportunities. However, to realize this potential, regulators will need to address a number of existing
regulatory ambiguities, such as uncertainties around token
taxonomy and the implications of regulatory pilot regimes.

8 Tokenization: Opportunities and Challenges
for the Automotive Industry
André Luckow
The automotive value chain is highly complex and
comprises many participants, e.g., suppliers, logistic companies, and dealers. Complexity arises from many sources,
for example, the need to integrate thousands of hardware
and software components across multilayer supply chains.
Besides customer demands for highly personalized products and details about the sources of product components,
ensuring safety, quality, and environmental standards
increase the complexity of supply chain management.
Supply chain transparency refers to practices that improve
the availability and quality of data along the supply chain
enabling the described capabilities. Simultaneously, supply
chain transparency is crucial for agility and resilience (e.g.,
the ability to quickly respond to demand changes).
Increasingly linear supply chains evolve toward more
flexible business ecosystems supported by information
technologies that can respond to the new business needs.
Tokenization is an important mechanism to establish
business ecosystems in the automotive value chain (e.g.,
for supply chains). Tokens can provide trusted, verifiable
information that can be used in cross-organizational processes and replace the existing paper-based processes. An
automotive supply chain can involve ten thousands of
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partners globally distributed across multiple tiers. This
complexity of direct and indirect business relationships
results in manifold opportunities for tokenization, including the exchange of product and logistic data, proof of
origins, and custom processing.
Tokenization offers the means to establish verifiable and
trustworthy artifacts, such as documents and certificates,
and share it across ecosystems (c.f. Section 6). Further,
tokenization can increase the attractiveness of ecosystems
by lowering the entry barriers for participants (e.g., suppliers and logistic companies) and reduce the transaction
costs (Laurent et al. 2020). Tokenization allows the augmentation of the physical and digital world. For supply
chain transparency, non-fungible assets (Lacity 2020) are
of particular interest (e.g., the representation of physical
vehicle sub-components, components, and parts via a
unique digital identifier). DLT is an essential technology
allowing to track tokens, share data, automate processes,
and facilitate the trading of tokenized assets. However, to
successfully instantiate a token economy, technological,
standardization, and governance aspects must be
considered.
8.1 Evolution of the Automotive Industry
The automotive industry has traditionally evolved as a
vertically integrated value chain rooted in need to integrate
every aspect of the process for mass production and to
become an economy of scale. However, since the 1930s,
the automotive industry’s degree of vertical integration
declined and the automotive industry evolved toward a
more decoupled, decentralized business network (Langlois
and Robertson 1989). Coase (1937) contrasts the difference
between markets, where a pricing mechanism governs
resource allocation, and firms, in which the entrepreneur
and managers coordinate production. Firms remove the
friction of complicated market structures and, thus, reduce
transaction costs. A firm emerges when coordination can be
done more efficiently in a central organization. The balance
between centralization and decentralization is continuously
evolving as technologies (e.g., DLT) reduce coordination
overheads, and customer needs and organizations change.
For example, the four ACES trends (i.e., autonomous,
connected, electric, and services; Holland-Letz et al. 2018)
impact the automotive industry leading to reconsiderations
of vertical integration, particularly concerning the software
(Fletcher et al. 2018), data, and energy storage. In other
areas, token-based ecosystems may allow for more flexible
and decentralized automotive value chains (e.g., for commodity parts).
This dynamic, unpredictable landscape of varying relationships between partners in the automotive value chain
led toward the rise of business ecosystems that provide
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some coordination and reduce the transaction costs compared to markets (Pidun et al. 2019).
8.2 Tokenization in the Automotive Value Chain
Automotive supply chain networks are vast and involve
many partners distributed across the globe. At the same
time, there are many manual and paper-based processes
hindering efficient cross-organizational collaboration. To
address these challenges, we evaluate tokenization and
DLT regarding their usage across the entire automotive
value chain, including supply chain management, logistics,
and vehicle-related services (e.g., driver license verification
or charging services; Garrido et al. 2020; Gudymenko et al.
2020).
In the following, we focus on the challenge of supply
chain transparency. Because of their complexity, supply
chain networks often lack transparency and trust. Keeping
track of all components, materials, orders, and locations is
challenging. As described by Lacity (see Sect. 4), due to
the many stakeholders and systems managed by these
stakeholders involved, no global view of all data exists. In
case of issues, this typically leads to highly manual and
error-prone reconciliation processes.
To address these challenges, we developed Partchain
(Miehle et al. 2019), a system for enhancing vehicle
components’ and materials’ traceability within complex
international supply chain networks. The objective of
Partchain is to enhance supply chain visibility and ensuring
the authenticity of every component. Partchain uses distributed ledger technologies, in particular Hyperledger
Fabric, and can be deployed on different infrastructures.
While traditional supply chain systems shield data between
the different parties, Partchain provides a unified way to
share and verify data.
As described by Lacity (see Sect. 4), tokenization
requires UIDs for representing physical assets as non-fungible tokens. A challenge is the definition and standardization of the UID format trading of the versatility of the
key, for example, by using a natural key, a synthetic key, or
a composite key. A natural key is based on attributes that
exist in the real world and allows for easier process integration because it contains critical identifying information
that can be used without further queries. In Partchain, we
utilize synthetic UIDs generated from the hash values from
individual components’ serial numbers. The UIDs are
associated with other meta-data, such as the manufacturing
date and location of the asset.
Initially, we focus on the traceability of original components to reduce the manipulation risk and fraud and
improve the diagnostics of part issues. We utilize flexible
and extensible data models that allow the tracking of
complex hierarchical component data. Generated tokens
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are passed on from partner to partner, including the OEM
in the final stage. Every participant in the system can
generates a new component tokens (i.e., a record for
describing component attributes, in particular serial number, manufacturer, location, and data). Component tokens
reference all components that were used for assembling the
component.
An important requirement is the ability to authorize
access to the data. For example, it is essential that only the
data owner can control access to the data she provided on a
very fine-grained level. For this purpose, we utilize
Hyperledger Fabric’s private data collections. Currently,
access to a record is only granted to immediate neighbors
in the value chain.
In the future, Partchain can be extended to support
traceability and full transparency for raw materials from
mine to factory. For example, materials like cobalt or
wolframite often originate from sources in developing
countries, making it difficult to monitor, for example,
working conditions, quality, and standards. As supply
chains involve many intermediaries, tracking and verifying
origins of all components is challenging and prone to fraud.
To digitize the existing practice of paper-based proofs, the
ability to create digital tamper-resistant proofs (e.g., certificates) plays an essential role. To support this use case
correctly, self-identification methods, such as chemical
fingerprints, are critical building blocks (see Sect. 4).
8.3 Practical Implications and Challenges
The number of use cases and opportunities in the automotive realm for tokenization is vast. However, there are
significant technological and business challenges that hinder the uptake of this technology. First, IT systems are still
designed for end-to-end, vertical processes, and not business ecosystems. In practice, this often means complex
onboarding processes and many one-to-one instead of
network transactions. With the availability of clouds and
distributed ledger technologies, the technological means to
digitize and optimize the automotive value chain are
readily available. While we demonstrated the scalability
and maturity of distributed ledgers (Sedlmeier et al. 2021),
various challenges remain, including the technological
integration of distributed ledgers with the legacy systems
of individual partners, standardization of data formats and
protocols, finding and implementing balanced incentives
that encourage participation in and governance of the
ecosystem.
Proposition 17: To successfully establish token ecosystems, a holistic consideration of business models, technology standards, and governance is required.
While systems, such as Partchain, demonstrated the
suitability of distributed ledgers for securely exchanging
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and verifying components’ data, they still need to show
their ecosystems’ viability. A first critical maturity level is
achieved by establishing a digital token for assets. This can
provide the technological basis for the digitization of
additional value streams in the future. However, achieving
a critical mass of partners and activities is challenging; the
initial costs for technological integration, lack of standards,
governance, operating, and business models slow the
adoption. Balancing the needs of ecosystem participants
and users, technology providers, and governance entities is
challenging and requires the reconciliation of competing
interests. Finding the right incentive models that work
across the partner ecosystem, thus, often requires intensive
experimentation.
While the long-term and strategic benefits of tokenbased ecosystems are apparent, creating ecosystems is
challenging in practice. While online service providers can
easily pursue platform-based business models (see Sect. 5), blueprints for decentral ecosystems do not exist.
Often, platform providers can subsidize the initial use and
adoption of the platform. After establishing a network
effect, the platform provider can monetize its user base by
facilitating and controlling supply and demand (Hein et al.
2020).
In decentralized ecosystems, incentive structures are
more complicated. Conflicting interests, long standardization and governance processes often slow down the creation of vibrant ecosystems. A successful approach
requires the confluence of the use case, standards, technology, and governance model. Thus, it is critical to define
an appropriate tactical approach for incrementally working
towards ecosystems and adapting, if necessary. It is
instrumental to develop the ecosystem in a business-centric
way and to emphasize shared benefits of all participants,
ensuring that the token-based ecosystem continuously
moves forward.
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